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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Allen, was convicted of tax evasion and fraudulent misuse of a social security number. On appeal, Allen argued that his sixth
amendment rights were violated because the district court improperly
denied his pro se motions for a continuance in order to retain
representation.
The Tenth Circuit held that Allen's sixth amendment right to assistance of counsei was violated. The court explained that the district court
failed to inquire whether Allen's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. The court reasoned that since an invalid waiver of a defendant's sixth amendment right denies him assistance of counsel, the
harmless error analysis is not applicable. Consequently, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dep't, 905 F.2d 1445
Author: Judge Logan
Decedent, Theresa Apodaca, was killed when her vehicle collided
with a vehicle driven by an employee of the Rio Arriba County Sheriff's
Department ("sheriff's department"). The estate of the decedent and
her parents brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming decedent was
deprived of life without due process of law and was seized in violation of
the fourth amendment. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the sheriff's department, and the Apodacas subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court stated that although the member of the sheriff's department was
acting under color of state law, negligent operation of a vehicle is not a
constitutional violation. Thus, there was no violation of due process.
Second, the court ruled the death of the decedent did not constitute a
seizure under the fourth amendment. To violate the fourth amendment,
a seizure must be unreasonable and intentional. Because the automobile accident was not intentionally caused by the member of the sheriff's
department, no valid constitutional claim existed.
Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Archuleta, a three-year-old child, alleged that his liberty
interest under the fourteenth amendment was violated when he witnessed a police officer's violent arrest of his father. The district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, police officer McShan. The district court reasoned that McShan's conduct was not di-
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rected toward Archuleta and, therefore, Archuleta's constitutional rights
were not violated. Archuleta appealed, contending that under the fourteenth amendment, he has a right to be free from emotional trauma suffered as a result of observing allegedly excessive police force directed
entirely at his father.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant McShan summary judgment. The court stated that the protections of due
process are not triggered by mere carelessness, but rather by an element
of deliberateness in directing the misconduct toward Archuleta.
Archuleta's claim, therefore, failed since he did not establish that McShan possessed the requisite intent to cause him physical harm or emotional damage. McShan merely inflicted indirect and unintended injury
as a result of police conduct directed at another.
Bee v. Greaves, 910 F.2d 686
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Greer, a jail psychiatrist, ordered thorazine to be given
forcefully to plaintiff, Bee, a pretrial detainee. Bee subsequently sued
Greer for violation of his constitutional rights. The jury found for Bee,
and he was awarded attorney's fees and costs. The district court judge,
however, reduced the award by fifty-percent. Bee appealed, asserting
that by reducing the damages awarded, the district court abused its discretion. Furthermore, Bee challenged the district court's refusal to
award his transportation costs to and from trial and his attorney's travel
expenses for earlier appeals. Greer also appealed, arguing that he was
entitled to qualified immunity because the law on involuntary medication was unclear at the time.
In determining the validity of Greer's claims, the Tenth Circuit discussed the Supreme Court's position on the issue. The court noted that
the Supreme Court stated that a mentally ill prisoner may not be treated
with antipsychotic drugs against his will without a hearing, and a pretrial
detainee has at least the rights of convicted prisoners. Because Bee had
no hearing regarding the medication and because Utah statutorily prohibits the administration of medication to involuntarily committed patients, the court held that Greer was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The court next addressed the reduction of fees and costs. Bee's fees
and costs were reduced by the district court because of limited success
in his overall litigation. The court noted that eighteen of nineteen defendants received favorable verdicts. This was recognized as a valid reason for limiting awards. Included in the reduction, however, were fees
and costs relating to two successful appeals. Therefore, this portion of
the decision was remanded for re-evaluation. Finally, the court held that
costs of transporting Bee to and from trial are clearly not encompassed
by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Accordingly, the district court correctly refused to
include these expenses.
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Beny v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489
Author: Judge Logan
The district court found that defendant, City of Muskogee (the
"city"), improperly controlled a prison holding facility, and was liable
for the wrongful death of plaintiff's, Berry's, husband. The jury found
in favor of Berry, and the city appealed. On appeal, the city alleged that
the district court erred by: (1) not submitting the case to thejury under
an eighth amendment standard; '(2) denying the defendant's motions
for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict for insufficiency of evidence; and (3) improperly instructing the jury that the
measure of damages should be based on Oklahoma's wrongful death
statute.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the case should have been submitted under an eighth amendment standard. The eighth amendment was
applicable since it is the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in claims alleging excessive force by governmental actors. Second, the court held that there was sufficient evidence in the
case to support a reasonable jury verdict on the issue of deliberate indifference. The court explained that ajury reasonably could conclude that
the city's conduct was the moving force in bringing about the constitutional violation. Specifically, no preventative action was taken after ajail
employee was informed of Berry's claims that her husband feared for his
life. Third, the district court erred in instructing the jury on a wrongful
death action. The court explained that the wrongful death action laws
do not carry out the full effects for § 1983 cases which end in the victim's death. Specifically, the laws are deficient in punishing the offenses.
Consequently, the district court's judgment was vacated and a new trial
was ordered.
Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435
Author: Judge Ebel
Dissent: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Brown, sought a declaratory judgment that bar letters issued by defendant, Peterson Air Force Base Commander Palmer
("Palmer"), were in violation of the first amendment. The letters were
issued in response to plaintiff Brown's refusal to cease distributing antiwar leaflets at Peterson Air Force Base (the "base") during open houses.
The district court concluded that the base became a public forum during
the open house, and that Palmer engaged in content-based regulation of
speech, which is impermissible in a public forum absent a compelling
state interest. Brown's request for declaratory relief was granted, and
Palmer appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court
noted the absence of extreme circumstances needed to transform a military base into a public forum. The open house did not constitute an
abandonment of a special interest in regulating the base, nor did it evi-
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dence an intention to turn the base into a public forum. In a non-public
forum, the government may impose content-based restrictions on
speech as long as its regulations are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
Here, the restrictions placed on Brown's speech were reasonable, as a
means of preserving security on the base, and viewpoint neutral in that
they were applied to all political material regardless of its ideological
message.
Clemmons v. Bohannon, 918 F.2d 858
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Clemmons, contended that his prison facility forced him to
reside in a cell with a smoker in contravention of his eighth and fourteenth amendment substantive due process rights. Moreover, he alleged that he was subjected to disciplinary segregation in retaliation for
his attempts to assert these constitutional rights. Defendant, Bohannon,
moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court.
Clemmons subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court
held that Bohannon's policy of permitting the double-ceiling of smokers
with nonsmokers against their expressed will can amount to a violation
of fourteenth amendment rights. The court remanded to the district
court to determine whether exposure to environmental tobacco smoke
amounted to an unreasonable risk of serous medical injury, thus proscribing Clemmons' eighth amendment right to a healthy rehabilitative
prison environment. Clemmons' fourteenth amendment due process
rights in this instance were deemed equivalent to his eight amendment
guarantee. Thus, Clemmons' due process claim was subsumed within
his eighth amendment claim. Furthermore, the court upheld the district
court's order dismissing the retaliation claim as frivolous.
Considine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 910 F.2d 695
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Considine, contended that termination of his employment
with defendant, Board of County Commissioners of Adams County (the
"board"), violated his first amendment rights. During his employment,
Considine made many critical statements generally related to public
health, safety, and welfare of certain county projects. Specifically, Considine stated that these projects were illegal, unsafe, or improper. The
board claimed that summary judgment was proper based on qualified
immunity. The district court denied the motion, and the board appealed, claiming that: (1) Considine's speech was not protected by the
first amendment; and (2) summary judgment was proper under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary
judgment. The court first characterized Considine's speech as that constituting a matter of public concern. The court then balanced his inter-
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est as a private citizen with the interest of the state. The court ruled that
the board did not present sufficient evidence to outweigh Considine's
interest in free speech. Accordingly, the board was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Second, the court ruled that the
board was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court reasoned that to afford qualified immunity protection,
two elements must not be clearly established: (1) Considine's statements constituted speech on matters of public concern; and (2) Considine's interest in making such statements outweigh the board's interest
in the effective functioning of the county government.
United States v. Dawes, 895 F.2d 1581
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendants, Donald and Phyllis Dawes (the "Daweses"), were convicted of willful failure to file income tax returns. The Daweses' motioned for a new trial, but it was denied. The Daweses appealed,
contending that they were denied their constitutional right to counsel at
trial.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to vacate the convictions and sentences. The
court treated the actions as motions for writs of error coram nobis. The
court held the right to counsel fundamental and, therefore, the Daweses
were entitled to a reversal of their convictions. The court noted that
vacancy of the Daweses' convictions would not prevent the government
from retrying them on the same charges.
Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Frazier, alleged that he was improperly transferred by defendant, Dubois, from the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth,
Kansas, to the Penitentiary in Lompoc, California, in retaliation for his
activities in the "Afrikan Cultural Society." He asserted that this was a
violation of his first amendment rights. Frazier also claimed that he was
arbitrarily placed in segregation without a hearing. The district court
dismissed the complaint as frivolous. The district court ruled that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not entitle a prisoner to a hearing when he is transferred. The court reasoned that the
prisoner does not have a liberty interest in assignment to a particular
prison.
The Tenth Circuit first ruled that prison officials do not have unbridled discretion to transfer inmates in retaliation for exercising other
constitutional rights. The court remanded the case, however, for a determination of whether the prison's regulations, which allegedly infringed on Frazier's constitutional rights, were reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests. The court also remanded Frazier's second claim that he was arbitrarily placed in segregation without a hearing. The court stated that the district court must determine if Frazier's
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due process rights were violated under Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5
(1980), and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Denver School District No. 1 (the "district"), appealed a
1985 district court ruling. This ruling stated that the district was not yet
racially "unitary" and, therefore, must undertake further remedial
changes. The district also appealed an interim decree issued by the district court to facilitate progress toward unitariness. The district first argued that its compliance with the original 1974 desegregation order
remedied any constitutional violation. It also contented there was no
constitutional right to any particular racial balance in a school's student
body. Further, concerns about the possible segregative effects of such
actions as implementation of a neighborhood school policy were irrelevant because discriminatory impact* is not a constitutional violation.
Last, the district alleged that there was no evidence of segregative intent
on the part of the school board.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's 1985 decision, holding that compliance with a court-ordered desegregation plan, without
more, does not make a district unitary. Moreover, the district's conduct
must be measured by its effectiveness, not the purpose of its actions in
decreasing segregation. The court stated that a school district must
eliminate all intentional racial discrimination and make every reasonable
effort to eradicate all effects of such discrimination before the court may
declare it unitary. The existence of racially identifiable schools is strong
evidence that segregation and its effects have not been eradicated. The
court also found no evidence that the district court erred in finding the
district's pupil assignment policies nonunitary. Also, the district court
did not err in ruling that the district failed to prove that existing resegregation resulted from demographic changes and not from actions of the
board. Having upheld the 1985 ruling, the court decided that the district court's interim decree, which eliminated reporting requirements
and allowed the district to change its desegregation plan without specific
court approval, was not unreasonably vague or indefinite. In addition, it
did not impose any objectionable prohibitions. The court only remanded the decree for language changes. The court instructed the district court to clarify that racial balance in any school or department need
not reflect racial proportions in the district as a whole, since there is no
constitutional right to any particular level of integration.
Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Plaintiffs, Laidley and others, were terminated from employment at
the Oklahoma District Attorney's office by defendant, McClain, the
newly elected district attorney. Laidley filed an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that McClain, Director Ritter, and the Board of County
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Commissioners violated his first amendment rights of free speech and
freedom of association. Laidley also asserted various pendent state
claims. The district court granted McClain's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the pendent claims.
The Tenth Circuit found that since no other plaintiff was named in
the notice of appeal, the notice was insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction over the omitted plaintiffs. First, Laidley raised a genuine issue
of material fact as to the circumstances of her dismissal. Accordingly,
the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of McClain individually and remanded the pendent claims to the district court. Summary
judgment in favor of McClain in his capacity as district attorney was affirmed. The court explained that the eleventh amendment generally
bars actions for damages against a state in federal court. Summary judgment in favor of the Board of County Commissioners was affirmed because the office of the district attorney falls under state, rather than
county, control. Summary judgment in favor of Ritter was affirmed because there was no evidence that Ritter or his office was involved in the
firing.
Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d 392
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Larson, appealed the district court's life imprisonment
sentence. Larson argued that his absence from portions of the trial, including jury instructions conference, jury instructions, closing arguments, and rendering of the verdict violated his constitutional rights.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the order finding no constitutional error
with regard to Larson's exclusion from the jury instructions conference.
The court reversed and remanded, however, regarding Larson's involuntary exclusion from the jury instructions, closing arguments, and rendering of the verdict. On de novo review, the court found that Larson did
have a constitutional right to be present for these particular hearings.
The court recognized that a defendant has a due process right to be
present at trial whenever such presence relates to or is reasonably substantial to his defense. Second, the court found that Larson did not
waive his right to be present. The court held that Larson's counsel
could not waive this right for him. Moreover, Larson's silent acquiescence to his removal did not suffice as a waiver.
Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Smith, a prisoner, brought suit. against defendant,
Maschner, claiming his constitutional rights were violated. Specifically,
Maschner deprived him of property without due process, interfered with
his mail, denied him due process during his disciplinary hearings, and
conspired to deny him access to the courts. As part of the conspiracy
claim, Smith contended that Maschner placed him in disciplinary segregation in retaliation for his litigation against prison officials and his "jail-
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house lawyering." The district court entered summary judgment
against Smith and denied his motion for partial summary judgment.
Smith appealed both judgments.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment against Smith on his deprivation of property claim. The court explained that the availability of a state post-deprivation remedy destroyed Smith's argument that Maschner deprived
him of property without due process. Second, Smith failed to demonstrate that the prison's regulation of his incoming mail violated any protected right. The court noted that regulations affecting the sending of
publications are valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Moreover, the opening of Smith's mail was an isolated
incident without improper motive or resulting interference. Accordingly, Smith's right to counsel or to access to the courts was not violated.
Further, Smith failed to provide evidence of any prison policy that mandated confiscating materials from the mail for punitive purposes. Third,
Smith received adequate notice of the disciplinary charges against him.
He was told the day before his first hearing. Also, although he was not
given a written statement of evidence supporting the disciplinary action,
Smith received a written transcript containing the required information.
Smith, however, was denied procedural due process at the disciplinary
hearing. The court explained that by denying Smith the opportunity to
call a witness, Maschner denied him any defense other than his own testimony. Fourth, there was sufficient evidence to find that Maschner took
improper disciplinary action against Smith, in retaliation for prior lawsuits. Thus, summary judgment on this claim was improper. Fifth, the
court ruled that prison inmates do not possess the right to a particular
prisoner's help in preparing legal materials. This does not mean, however, that Smith failed to state a constitutional claim. Smith's assertion
that Maschner denied him his right to use litigation to effect change in
the prison stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
McCarthy v. Maddigan, 914 F.2d 1411
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, McCarthy, an inmate in a federal penitentiary, brought suit
for damages claiming that defendant Maddigan's deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs was a violation of his eighth amendment
rights. The district court dismissed McCarthy's claim without prejudice.
McCarthy subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court
stated that when a federal prisoner seeks only money damages to redress an alleged constitutional violation, an exhaustion of administrative
remedies is required. McCarthy failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies.
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Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 906 F.2d 1434
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiffs, Morfin and Kotlisky, spouses and school employees, filed
suit claiming they were retaliated against for engaging in constitutionally protected conduct, including free speech, union association, and
marital association. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Davenport and Mondragon, school supervisors, holding that a
portion of the conduct was not protected. The district court also ruled,
however, that other conduct engaged in by the spouses fell under the
qualified immunity doctrine. Morfin and Kotlisky subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part. The
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Mondragon
regarding the alleged retaliatory conduct taken against Morfin. The
court explained that there was no evidence that Mondragon had contact
with Morfin. The court also upheld the district court's decision regarding qualified immunity on the free speech claims. The court explained
that public officials are protected by qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established rights. At the time the challenged actions were taken, it was not clear that the plaintiff's criticism of
Davenport was protected speech. Therefore, Davenport and Mondragon were qualifiedly immune. The court further found, though, that
the right to associate with a union is clearly established. Thus, Davenport and Mondragon were not qualifiedly immune in this circumstance.
Morfin's claim that her first amendment right was violated failed, however, because she did not assert that she assisted Kotlisky's pursuit of his
complaints. Sufficient factual disputes existed on the marital association
claim, however, to render summary judgment inappropriate.
Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Myatt, was convicted of committing indecent liberties
with a minor. Myatt petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which was later
dismissed by the district court. Myatt appealed, alleging: (1) Kansas's
child hearsay statute was unconstitutional on its face because it failed to
require adequate indicia of reliability; and (2) the admission of hearsay
statements violated his sixth amendment right of confrontation.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Kansas Supreme Court previously found the child hearsay statute consistent
with the Kansas Constitution, and federal courts must accept this decision unless it is inconsistent with principles of liberty and justice. Moreover, the court stated that the Kansas Supreme Court properly required
that child hearsay statements possess adequate indicia of reliability,
which must be established on a case-by-case basis before the statement
may be admitted into evidence. Second, the right of confrontation has
never been regarded as absolute, but occasionally must give way to pub-
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lic policy and necessities of a case. The Supreme Court has held, inter
alia, that the prosecution must show that hearsay evidence bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Here, the child victim was examined four times by a child psychiatrist who testified that the child was
a credible witness and knew right from wrong. The court was, therefore,
satisfied that the hearsay statements were reliable.
NationalAdvertising Co. v. City and County of Denver, 912 F.2d 405
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, National Advertising Company ("National"), a seller of
billboard advertising space, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, and damages stemming from two ordinances enacted by defendant, City and County of Denver ("Denver"). These ordinances, one
which superseded the other, restricted the placement of billboards along
freeways. National, therefore, claimed that it was entitled to relief for
violations of the first amendment, the just compensation clause as incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, and the due process and equal
protection clauses. The district court rejected all of National's claims.
National subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court
first held that the new ordinance permissibly regulates commercial
speech under the first amendment. Second, the new ordinance's failure
to define the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech with total clarity, did not render it unconstitutionally vague. Nor
did it grant Denver "unfettered" discretion. Third, National's claims for
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief under the old ordinance
were properly dismissed as moot. Fourth, National's damage claims for
deprivation of constitutional rights arising from denial of its applications
for permits to construct signs failed. The court explained that the denials were properly based on a facially valid pending ordinance. Finally,
National's inverse condemnation claim was unripe.
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492
Author: Judge Logan
Dissent: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Planned Parenthood, brought suit challenging the amendments to Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2,
59.5, 59.7-59.10. The amended regulations prohibit Title X participants
from advising women about abortion as a medical option. Moreover,
the regulations require physical, financial, and legal separation of Title
X supported facilities from any others that counsel about or perform
abortions. The district court entered a permanent injunction against
implementation of the new regulations, reasoning that they violate congressional intent and the constitutional rights of women patients.
First, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's injunction. The
court ruled that congressional intent was violated by denying issuance of
Title X grants solely because the grantee was not sufficiently funded to
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meet the separation requirement. The court explained that the requirement would restrict the number of permissible grantees under Title X.
The court further held that the requirements restricting the disclosure
of abortion options were unconstitutional. The court reasoned that
prohibiting the physician from relaying information necessary in his professional judgment created a constitutionally impermissible obstacle to a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice. The court also noted that
restricting the physicians' disclosure of the abortion option implicates
the physicians' guarantees of free speech.
Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673
Author: Judge Baldock
The Oklahoma Department of Human Services ("DHS") conducted
an investigation of plaintiffs', the Snells', home based on allegations of
child abuse. The Snells subsequently brought suit seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The district court
denied injunctive relief, the § 1985 claim was dismissed, and only four
DHS employees remained as defendants. The issues on appeal were
whether the DHS employees were entitled to absolute or qualified immunity, and whether the Snells' fourth amendment right against illegal
searches of their home was violated. Defendants, Swepson, Siek, Levingston, and Padley appealed the district court's decision denying them
both absolute and qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
stated that the three non-attorney defendants, Swepson, Siek, and Levingston, were acting not in a prosecutorial but an investigative capacity
and, therefore, did not warrant absolute immunity. Moreover, DHS attorney Padley, though acting in a prosecutorial fashion, did so without
authority and thus was denied absolute immunity. The court also affirmed the denial of all four defendants' qualified immunity due to the
fact that they obtained a court order using knowingly false information
in violation of the fourth amendment. The court thus remanded the
§ 1983 claim for trial.
Turney v. O'Toole, 898 F.2d 1470
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Turney, a 17-year-old juvenile, argued that his constitutional rights were violated when he was placed in an adult maximum
security unit of a mental hospital pursuant to a judicial order. Turney
brought suit against the hospital's superintendent, O'Toole, and a psychologist, Featherston. The district court held O'Toole and Featherston
were absolutely immune from liability and dismissed the suit. Turney
subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that O'Toole and Featherston were absolutely immune from liability arising out of Turney's confinement. The
court held that immunity applies with full force to a judicial order requiring a person be detained for a mental evaluation. The court also
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ruled, however, that the defendants were only qualifiedly immune from
liability arising from conditions in which Turney was held. The court
reasoned that absolute immunity extends only to acts prescribed by a
judicial order. Since the decree only ordered confinement and did not
dictate specific treatment or confinement, the defendants were not absolutely immune from liability arising out of Turney's placement. Accordingly, the court remanded for further consideration.

